Abstract. We analyse party entry and exit through the lens of candidate turnover using a dataset on 200,000 candidates in 61 Central and Eastern European (CEE) elections. Amongst new parties – as defined in three widely used datasets – candidate novelty is generally high, but there are prominent cases with low novelty. Several significant parties have intermediate levels of novelty – such partially new parties defy classification as new or continuing. Full party exit is rare as parties tend to leave behind many important candidates. We complement the quantitative analysis of candidate turnover with in depth discussion of particular problematic cases.

The contentious cases of party entry and exit significantly affect volatility indices – particularly those that distinguish between intra- and extra-system volatility. The impossibility of coding partially new parties “correctly” as new or old challenges the dichotomous notion of party newness. The problem is particularly common in Central and Eastern Europe, but significant instances of partially new parties can be found everywhere. This paper also offers suggestions on improved ways to measure party system change.

Politics is run by people – political institutions and organisations would be nothing without the individuals that give them life. Political parties, too, are driven by people and electoral candidates are their lifeblood. They are central to parties’ main functions – to present people for election (Riggs, 1968: 51) and implement policies. Candidates – especially the top ranking ones – are the literal “face” of parties and, more metaphorically, the DNA that determines what the parties are. Yet candidates are not wedded to parties permanently – they can leave or join politics, change parties, follow or stay behind when parties split or merge – constantly mutating the party DNA. Even parties that appear stable in terms of leaders and organisation change subcutaneously – and change in candidates (and, by extension, representatives) can fundamentally alter their substance.

This paper analyses party and party system change through the prism of electoral candidates. Given that in every election many more candidates run for parliament than there are seats, the data sets quickly inflate in size. However, this ‘Big Data’ – as it is exhaustive and constantly generated – is ‘big but thin’, meaning that there is often only a limited amount of variables (i.e. candidate name, party, constituency and result). To trace candidate movements – in and out of parties and between parties – over consecutive elections, we use an original code in R that makes best use of the limited information available. The resulting novel data set ‘Electoral Candidates in Central and Eastern Europe’ (ECCEE) – including 200,000 electoral from 61 Central and Eastern European (CEE) elections since 1990 – forms

* We are indebted to Eleanor Neuff Powell, Joshua Tucker, Scott Mainwaring, Carlos Gervasoni, Annabella España-Najera and Margit Tavits for sharing their raw data; we also thank Piret Ehin, John Ishiyama, Georgia Kernell, Herbert Kitschelt, Vello Pettai and Rein Taagepera for useful comments and feedback on earlier versions of the paper. Research for this paper was funded by the European Commission’s FP7 ANTICORRP project, Grant No. 290529.
the basis of this paper, which is a draft chapter for a prospective book on the project (and hence slightly deviates from the traditional paper style).¹

The main concern of this chapter is party entry, exit and continuity. As explained elsewhere (Sikk & Köker 2017a), we prefer to talk about electons instead of parties entry and exit. Electon is a joint term that refers to electoral parties and electoral coalitions (and any other formations) in a single election. It puts the electoral face of parties in the focus and avoids the – often unnecessary – distinction between parties and coalitions.² The term is very close to classic party definitions such as ‘any organization which nominates candidates for election to a legislature’ (Riggs, 1968: 51). Thus, we use “electons” to refer to “parties and electoral coalitions” or “electoral units”, reserving “party” mostly to refer to a party as an organisation that (a) can run elections independently or (b) as part of a coalition or (c) does not contest an election at all or (d) we lack information about it (e.g. due to low support). Only very occasionally, where the context is clear, we use “party” as a synonym for “electon”.

In the political science Garden of Eden there were two kinds of electons – those that never change and those that are new through and through. Unfortunately, this paradise, if it ever existed, has been lost; old electons transform in various ways and sometimes even disappear; new ones come in various guises, some hiding little novelty under a shiny new overlay. However, studies on new parties and electoral volatility – where distinguishing between new, disappearing and continuing electons is critical – seldom problematise party newness. Only a handful of recent studies have proposed that party novelty can be a matter of degree and some electons, often very successful, sit uneasily in either the “old” or “new” camp (see Barnea & Rahat 2011, Litton 2015, the issues are also recognised by O’Dwyer 2014). Likewise, “party death” (Bolleyer, Correa Vila & Katz 2018, Beyens, Lucardie & Deschouwer 2016, Haughton & Deegan-Krause 2015) is not always as terminal as it sounds, while some parties that persist, suffer life-changing traumatic injuries.³

Our starting point is the concept of genuinely new electons, meaning parties that change party politics substantively in contrast to those that are essentially continuations of old parties (see Sikk 2005). We will look at how candidate turnover helps us to distinguish between the former and the latter and how it matches classifications used in existing studies. However, some important new parties are neither here nor there. For example, Barnea & Rahat (2011) present Israel’s Kadima, established in 2005, as an archetypal case of a partially novel electon.

¹ For more details on the dataset and measures used in the paper see Sikk & Köker 2016 and 2017b.
² Note that the distinction between parties and electoral coalitions is often difficult to make for various reasons. Firstly, tables of electoral results do not necessarily distinguish between them. Secondly, coalitions can transform into parties, sometimes metamorphosing at the time of an election. Thirdly, party lists sometimes include candidates who are members of other parties instead of forming a formal coalition or dummy parties can combine candidates without a formal merger (e.g. when electoral rules are unfavourable to electoral coalitions). Finally, some electoral coalitions are remarkably stable – e.g., the Latvian Union of Greens and Farmers (ZZS) has contested five elections together – while some parties are not.
³ We use quotation marks to mark our unease with the anthropomorphic metaphors. As we will see below, “life” and “death” is not a binary opposition in the world of political parties. Indeed, some “dead” parties have stayed very much “alive” when seen through the prism of candidates. The variation in the forms of party death has been noted by Bolleyer, Correa Vila & Katz (2018), but our analysis of Central and Eastern Europe suggests a distinction between “merger death” and “dissolution death” is not always straightforward and “dissolution death” can occur under various circumstances, not always linked to party weakness.
It obviously had a new identity, but was only partially new in terms of its leader and top candidates. The party was created by Ariel Sharon who had been the leader of Likud, shortly followed by Ehud Olmert, another very prominent erstwhile leader of Likud. 40% of Kadima’s top-ranking candidates were new, 40% came from Likud, 10% from Labour (and 10% from smaller parties; Sikk & Köker 2017a). As we will see below, similar instances of partial novelty are very common in Central and Eastern Europe, but they also exist in Western Europe.4

Our analysis of electon continuity, entry and exit has three key messages. First, we show that a casual reading of party histories and identities can miss important continuities and affect the impression of overall new party support. Secondly, party continuities can be complex – sometimes it is impossible to pin down electons as they vary from the genuinely new and partially new to the not-particularly-new. Finally, when looking at candidate dropout, we see that parties seldom “genuinely exit” – even those that experience a proper breakdown leave behind significant numbers of candidates. The lessons of this chapter are significant for the study of new parties, the emergent study of party demise and, by extension, to the study of party system development, particularly where the electoral volatility index is used.

Relationship between overall candidate turnover and electon entry and exit

What is the expected relationship between electon entry/exit and candidate turnover in the hypothetical ideal world? In such a world: (a) new electons only enlist new candidates, (b) exiting electons do not leave any candidates behind and (c) the candidate lists of continuing electons stay intact. Under these conditions there is a perfect correspondence between the vote share for new electons and overall weighted candidate novelty (WCN), and the vote share of parties exiting in the next election and overall weighted candidate dropout (WCD, see Figure 1).5

Figure 1. Expected relationship between electon and candidate novelty/dropout

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4 E.g. the Danish People’s Party founded in 1995 and, to a degree, La République En Marche! (France 2017) – nearly 10% of its elected MPs were incumbents.

5 The overall weighted candidate novelty/dropout (WCN, WCD) is the average turnover among electons (WCN, WCD), weighted by electons’ electoral support so that larger ones contribute more and smaller ones less to the overall index. Note that candidate turnover for individual electons (WCN, WCD) is based on weighting by candidate prominence so that change among more important candidates (generally those with higher list placement) contribute more to the index than less important candidates. For full details of the weighting see Sikk & Köker (2017b: 27-28).
However, as we will see below, many of the continuing, entering and exiting electons are far from this idealised picture. Firstly, continuing electons experience natural candidate turnover. This lifts candidate novelty and dropout above the diagonals on Figure 1. Secondly, new electons can enrol candidates that run before and exiting electons can leave candidates behind who then run for other electons. This would pull candidate turnover down from diagonals. Hence, it would be dogmatic to ask all elections to lie on the diagonals. However, large deviations from the diagonals would suggest: (a) extensive change in continuing electons casting doubt on their “oldness”, (b) many old candidates in new electons, challenging their newness or (c) swathes of candidates left behind by exiting electons calling into question whether exit means exit. In other words, (a) suggests overestimated continuities while (b) and (c) that significant continuities between electons are overlooked.

Figure 2 highlights the imperfect correspondence between WCN/WCD and total electoral support for entering and exiting electons (based on data from Powell & Tucker 2014). As noted above, one should not expect a perfect correlation between the variables (dashed diagonals). Even if no new electon entered (vertical axis on the left), there would still be a degree of candidate novelty. If electons experience considerable internal change, novelty can be significant – in several elections the vote share of entering electons was under 20% yet WCN was above 0.50 (similar logic applies for exit/dropout, see the top left triangles on Figure 2).

Figure 2. Electon entry/exit and weighted candidate turnover

The bottom–right triangles on Figure 2 are more problematic. In several elections, apparently entering electons won a majority of votes while candidate turnover only hovered around 0.50. Hence, the apparently new electons must have fielded old candidates – if all had been genuinely new in terms of their candidates, the overall candidate novelty would have to be above the diagonal line. In several elections, this was far from the case – particularly in three Lithuanian elections, Slovakia 1998 and Poland 1997. Yet, all elections below the diagonal are problematic suggesting that new electons were “contaminated” by old candidates.6

Similar problems apply for exiting electons and low candidate dropout on Figure 2(b). In most cases, exiting electons had previously garnered the support of less than 50% of voters. Often, WCD was higher, attributed to candidate turnover amongst continuing parties.

6 Note that the lack of novelty among apparently new electons is so high as to compensate for the natural and substantive candidate turnover among continuing electons.
However, there are striking outliers, again from Latvia and Lithuania and Slovakia. Lithuania 2000–04 is the most prominent by some margin – a huge majority of electons (91% of votes in 2000) seemingly exited, while candidate dropout was below average (WCD = 0.31). Hence, two thirds of candidates were familiar faces even though nearly all electons had seemingly disappeared.

Before returning to these puzzles arising from aggregate picture, we zoom in on candidate novelty and dropout among individual electons.

**Entering and exiting electons: Existing approaches**

How to spot a new party? It is easiest to rely on the work of other scholars and use existing datasets on elections and parties. For example, the MARPOR (Volkens et al 2017) and ParlGov (Döring and Manow 2016) datasets cover all countries and elections covered by the ECCEE dataset and include codes for individual electons. We can pin down continuing parties using these codes in consecutive elections – a new code identifies a new electon and a repeated code a continuing electon. The approach is not infallible as it fails to identify some continuing parties and wrongly identifies some cases of entry or exit. After all, tracing parties over time was not a key aim of either MARPOR or ParlGov, but we can assume that the compilers stuck to existing codes when they knew – based on academic sources or other information – that a party was a continuation and introduced new codes when not.

This “basic approach” based on party codes in the two datasets does a surprisingly good job in identifying new and continuing electons. Still, three existing datasets on electoral volatility, party entry and exit – by Powell & Tucker (below: PT), Mainwaring, Gervasoni & España–Najera (2017, MGE), and Margit Tavits (2008, MT) – perform significantly better. This is not surprising as those who study new parties and party system change need to pay much closer attention to continuities and discontinuities.

For the purposes of this analysis, we connected ParlGov and MARPOR datasets and raw data generously shared by the authors of the three data sets. Note that the coverage of the datasets varies. Firstly, the datasets vary in terms of vote share thresholds – PT treat as ‘new’ all parties that won less than 2% in the previous election, MT sets the threshold at 0.3% (either in PR or SMD) and MGE do not specify an explicit threshold. MT covers party entry in Central and Eastern Europe from the early 1990s until 2004, MGE until 2006, and PT up to 2009.

Figure 3 shows total vote shares of entering electons over time according to the basic approach and the three datasets. In most elections, entering electons won less than a majority of votes (median = 24% according to the basic approach and PT, 13% according to MT and MGE). They managed to win more than 40% of the votes in only a handful of elections – 13% according to MGE and 10% according to MT. However, PT and the basic approach suggest that such level of success is considerably more frequent – 35% and 30% of elections, respectively. Regardless of the data source, well-known earthquake elections

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7 Where corresponding codes for parties were missing, MARPOR, ParlGov and PT were matched using party vote shares. Where vote shares of several parties were too close to each other or where there were errors in datasets, we added precision to the vote shares or corrected them using the best available data. MT and MGE were connected to the other datasets manually. A table with corresponding codes is available on the book website.
stand out, e.g. Bulgaria 2001 and 2009, Latvia 2002, Poland 2001 and Slovakia 2002. Also visible is the stability in Hungary, stabilisation in Estonia and Slovakia and increasing turbulence since 2010 in Czechia and Slovenia (captured by the basic approach).

**Figure 3 Electon entry (percent of votes)**

![Graph showing election entry percentages over time for various countries](image)

However, we see significant discrepancies between the data sources. For example, the indices suggests that nearly all (basic and PT) or less than half (MT and MGE) of existing Lithuanian parties were wiped out in the 2004 elections. Powell & Tucker (2014) record for Lithuania 2000–2004 the second highest volatility among the nearly one hundred post-communist elections included in their dataset that includes highly unstable elections in countries such as Ukraine or Georgia. In reality, no such disruption happened – Prime Minister Algirdas Brazauskas returned to office together with close to half of his cabinet (including both the Foreign and the Finance Minister).

Disagreement between the four approaches is highlighted on scatterplot matrix in Figure 4. The indices are clearly correlated – as expected given that they should measure exactly the same thing and one would hope for the data to fall close to a straight line. The highest correlation (between MT and MGE) is a respectable 0.89, but there are still significant deviations on individual elections. The correlations between PT and others are lower – similar to its correlation to the basic approach. For many elections, the factor of disagreement between indices is more than two – i.e. one source suggests a level of new party support more than twice as high as another (the observations outside the solid grey lines in

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8 Parties supported by 84% of voters previously disappeared (see Figure 3 below).
For still a significant number of elections, the magnitude of disagreement is even higher – more than four times higher (outside the dashed grey lines on Figure 4) in PT than MT for a third of the elections included in both of the datasets. These are remarkable discrepancies for indices measuring the same thing.

**Figure 4. Scatterplot matrix between election entry datasets**

Note: The diagonal shows distribution of new party vote shares in respective datasets. The top half shows correlation and bottom half scatterplots between the measures. Solid grey lines demarcate disagreement by a factor of two, dashed grey lines by a factor of four.

Figure 5 shows party exit over time according to PT and the basic approach. Disagreements are expected, as Powell & Tucker were specifically interested in the phenomenon unlike the two datasets behind the basic approach. Strikingly, for five out of the forty elections, PT reports that parties previously winning the majority of votes disappeared (total exit > 50%). Most of these electoral cycles already stood out in terms of high levels of new party entry. However, high levels of exit do not automatically entail high levels of entry – party demise can benefit other existing parties (Poland 2005–2007 and the Czech Republic 1992–1996). Likewise, new party entry can lead to only weakening rather than exit of old parties (Bulgaria 1997–2001). High correspondence between entry and exit can be suggestive of non-genuine turnover, where seemingly exiting electons are replaced by … themselves (see Appendix 2 for a brief analysis).

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What could explain the striking discrepancies between the sources and some unexpectedly high levels of overall election entry and exit? In the next two sections, we turn our attention on candidate novelty and dropout in individual elections before suggesting a new method for distinguishing entering, exiting and continuing elections based on candidate turnover.¹¹

**Entry and candidate novelty**

How novel are the entering and continuing elections in terms of their candidates? The analysis of the relationship between aggregate entry/exit and candidate turnover suggests that entering elections are not always particularly novel. The weighted candidate novelty (WCN) scores for the 20 most successful new entries in PT reveal that less than half were genuinely new in terms of candidates (see Table 1). Seven of the elections were *genuinely new* in terms of candidates (WCN ≥ 0.8) and all three approaches covered in the table agree on them. For the remainder, there were differences in classification between PT and the basic approach and even more differences between PT and MT – MT classifies only two of the twelve elections as new (excluding RP 2007 not covered by the scope of MT). The effect on candidate novelty on agreement in classification is remarkable – at least among the top scores for WCN, as there is considerably more disagreement between the basic approach and

¹¹ Our analysis mostly focusses on PT as it covers more elections included in the ECCE dataset than the others do and is explicitly concerned with both party entry and exit but the issues identified also apply to the others.
MT further down the list. This pattern is analysed in more detail in Appendix 3, together with the discussion of the effect of familiarity with individual electons (proxies of party and country size). We find that apparent (but non-genuine) exit and entry are more common in smaller (or less familiar) countries. There is also notable convergence of opinions for larger parties and divergence for smaller parties.

Table 1 Largest entering electons: candidate novelty

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Party Name</th>
<th>WCN</th>
<th>V%</th>
<th>NEC</th>
<th>GNE</th>
<th>GNE</th>
<th>GNE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LV 2002</td>
<td>JL New Era</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>GNE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LT 2008</td>
<td>TPP National Resurrection Party</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>GNE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BG 2001</td>
<td>NDSV National Movement Simeon the Second</td>
<td>42.7</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>GNE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BG 2009</td>
<td>GERB Citizens for European Development of BUL</td>
<td>39.7</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>GNE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LT 2004</td>
<td>DP Labour Party</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>GNE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EE 2003</td>
<td>RP Union for the Republic</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>GNE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LT 2000</td>
<td>NS New Union (Social Liberals)</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>GNE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LT 2000</td>
<td>LLS Lithuanian Liberal Union</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>Borderline GNE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LT 1996</td>
<td>TS Homeland Union</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>Coalition successor</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EE 1995</td>
<td>ER Estonian Reform Party</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>Partially new electon</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SI 2004</td>
<td>SDS Slovenian Democratic Party</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>Name change</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LV 1998</td>
<td>TP People’s Party</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>Partially new electon</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LV 2002</td>
<td>PCTVL For Human Rights in a United Latvia</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>NEC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SK 2002</td>
<td>SDKÚ Slovak Democratic and Christian Union</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>Coalition successor</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PL 1997</td>
<td>AWS Electoral Action ‘Solidarity’</td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>NEC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SK 1998</td>
<td>SDL’ Party of the Democratic Left</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>coalition</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LT 2000</td>
<td>BSDK A. Brazauskas Social Democratic Coalition</td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>NEC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SK 1998</td>
<td>SDK Slovak Democratic Coalition</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>NEC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EE 2007</td>
<td>RP Union for the Republic</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Merger</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LT 2004</td>
<td>Udl Working for Lithuania</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>NEC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


More than half of the electons in Table 1 had WCN below 0.8 and are not genuinely new in terms of their candidates. Several of the entrants were newly formed electoral coalitions, dominated or led by previously existing parties, which explains their low or very low levels of candidate novelty. Three others were successors to coalitions. TS (LT 1996) emerged from the independence movement that competed in the 1992 elections as a relatively loose coalition, yet as the new party was led by the same leader, it still kept a comparatively large number of candidates. The Slovak SDKÚ (2002) was the successor of SDK (1998) – an electoral coalition also included in Table 1. After the founding of SDKÚ, many candidates did not join the new formation, returned to their original parties and were replaced by new ones. SDL’ (SK 1998) had been the runner-up in the 1992 parliamentary elections and the leading member of the left-wing ‘Common Choice’ coalition in 1994. After the coalition was dissolved, the SDL’ once again formed its own parliamentary group and ran independently in 1998.

Three of the electons in Table 1 were partially new parties. TP (LV 1998) of Andris Šķēle, a former (non-partisan) Prime Minister, brought in new faces but also siphoned candidates off from other parties. ER (EE 1995) was a merger of the (new) Reform Party and the Liberal Democratic Party, part of an electoral coalition in 1992. Finally, LLS (LT 2000) was an existing parliamentary party that experienced major changes and constitutes a true borderline genuinely new party. RP (EE 2007) was a merger between the RP, a genuinely new  

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12 Legally, the SDK was a political party, yet the participating parties did not merge and retained their organisational integrity.

13 Former Prime Minister Rolandas Paksas joined the party and became its leader. As a result, LLS increased its number of seats in the parliament from one to 34. It was classified as absent in 1996 according to PT as it fell just
party in 2003 and the long-established Pro Patria (IL) – hence the low level of candidate turnover. Finally, SDS (SI 2002) – a sizable parliamentary party since 1990 – merely changed name in 2003. While there are (competing) approaches to dealing with the mergers and name changes in electoral volatility calculations, partially new parties present considerable difficulties. Volatility is very high if they are seen as entries, but decreases considerably if seen as continuing parties – in reality, they are neither. We will return to the conundrum of partially new electons and electoral volatility in the discussion section of the paper.

Of all highly novel electons (WCN ≥ 0.75, V% ≥ 5%, see Appendix 1), only two were continuing parties according to both the basic approach and PT: the Czech Association for the Republic in 1996 and and the Slovenian Democratic Party of Pensioners in 2008. Both had WCN close to the threshold of 0.75 and were clearly instances of existing parties that experienced a substantial influx of new candidates. Interestingly, nearly half of the highly novel electons are from a 19-year period included in the PT dataset and the other half from a 7-year period since 2010. In other words, high candidate novelty among serious parties has become more common over time. Four of the six most successful recent cases are from Slovenia and Czeckia – countries that used to be considered to boast the most consolidated party systems in the region (e.g. O’Dwyer 2014).

### Table 2 Largest continuing electons: candidate novelty

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>V%</th>
<th>WCN</th>
<th>basic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EE 1995 KMU Coalition Party and Rural Union</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HU 1994 MSzP Hungarian Socialist Party</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BG 1997 ODS United Democratic Forces</td>
<td>52.2</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SI 2008 SD Social Democratic Party</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CZ 1996 ODS Civic Democratic Party</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CZ 2006 ODS Civic Democratic Party</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CZ 2006 CSSD Czech Social Democratic Party</td>
<td>32.3</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PL 2001 SLD-UP Coalition of the Democratic Left Alliance and the Union of Labour</td>
<td>41.0</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CZ 2002 CSSD Czech Social Democratic Party</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HU 2006 FiDeSz-MPSz-KDNP Alliance of Federation of Young Democrats – Hungarian Civic Union - Christian Democratic People’s Party</td>
<td>42.0</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SI 2008 SDS Slovenian Democratic Party</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PL 2007 PO Civic Platform</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BG 2005 KzB Coalition for Bulgaria</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HU 1998 FiDeSz-MPP Federation of Young Democrats - Hungarian Civic Party</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CZ 1998 CSSD Czech Social Democratic Party</td>
<td>32.3</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HU 2002 MSzP Hungarian Socialist Party</td>
<td>42.1</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HU 2006 MSzP Hungarian Socialist Party</td>
<td>43.2</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HU 1998 MSzP Hungarian Socialist Party</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PL 2007 PiS Law and Justice</td>
<td>32.1</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HU 2002 FiDeSz-MPP-MDF FiDeSz-MPP-MDF-Alliance</td>
<td>41.1</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Continuing electons based on Powell & Tucker 2014. Asterisks mark electons classified as new by the basic approach.

Most of the largest continuing electons (Table 2) had a WCN below 0.33, only two of them scoring above 0.5, both from mid-1990s. KMU (EE 1995) was a coalition whose link to the identified predecessor coalition was tenuous – only two of the KMU’s five components overlapped. The high novelty of MSzP (HU 1994) is more surprising as it was a genuine continuing party. This communist successor party changed in terms of ideology and

below the 2% inclusion threshold. Had it won 1,000 extra votes, it would have probably been a continuing electon according to PT.

14 MT adds Self–Defence of the Polish Republic (2001) to the list – an electon that had scored a very poor result in previous election and was thus classified as new in PT.

15 WCN in continuing electons has decreased over time. The mean WCN for continuing electons (as defined by PT or the basic approach) until 2000 was 0.41, dropping to 0.33 since. The trend persists when controlling for party size (larger parties tend to have fewer new candidates, see Sikk & Köker 2017b).
personnel after a lacklustre performance in the first democratic elections. Its subsequent success in 1994 catapulted many new candidates to winnable list places, increasing weighted candidate novelty.

**Exit and candidate dropout**

When looking at the electon exit, i.e. those not running again in subsequent elections, it is striking that of the twenty most popular electons (before exiting, obviously) only two disappeared from the electoral scene together with a majority of their candidates (see Table 3). In half of the cases, more than two thirds of their candidates ran for parliament again.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3 Largest exiting electons: candidate dropout</th>
<th>V%</th>
<th>WCD</th>
<th>basic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SK 1994-98 SV Common Choice</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>Fizzled out</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SK 1998-2002 SDK Slovak Democratic Coalition</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>*coalition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SK 1998-2002 SDL Party of the Democratic Left</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PL 2005-07 SRP Self-Defence of the Polish Republic</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LT 1992-96 LKPK Lithuanian Christian Democratic Party</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>Coalition breakup</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HU 1998-2002 FKGP Independent Smallholders’ Party</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PL 1993-97 UD Democratic Union</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>Merger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EE 2003-07 RP Res Publica - Union for the Republic</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>Merger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SI 2000-04 SDSS Social-Democratic Party of Slovenia</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>Name change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LT 2000-04 NS New Union (Social Liberals)</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>Entered coalition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LT 1992-96 SK Sajudis Coalition</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>Coalition breakup</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LV 1995-98 DPS Democratic Party ‘Saimnieks’</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PL 2005-07 SLD Democratic Left Alliance</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>* Entered coalition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LT 2000-04 LLS Lithuanian Liberal Union</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>* Split</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EE 1992-95 RR Electoral Union ‘Popular Front’</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>** Coalition breakup</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CZ 1992-96 LB Left Bloc</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LT 2000-04 BSDK A. Brazaukas Social Democratic Coalition</td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>** Coalition breakup</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LV 1995-98 TKL-ZP Popular Movement for Latvia-Zigerista Party</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LV 1998-2002 TSP National Harmony Party</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>* Entered coalition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LT 2004-08 Udl Working for Lithuania</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>Coalition breakup</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Exiting electons based on Powell & Tucker 2014.

* electons classified as not exiting according to the basic approach.

** fell below 2% of vote in the following electon and therefore excluded from P&T

While most of the electons did lose an independent electoral presence, this often involved **creation or breakup of electoral coalitions**. Most of the electons in Table 3 either went on to enter new coalitions or were disbanded – both often with a clearly dominant party. For instance, the fizzled out Slovak coalitions SDK and SV donated about half of the candidates to future electons or candidates’ home parties when they ran as independent electons. The seemingly exiting electon with lowest WCD was UdL (2004) – a one-off coalition led by the Social Democratic Party (LSDP in 2000),16 that in turn was the dominant party of the BSDK coalition in 2000.17 Electoral coalitions RR (EE 1992) and SK (LT 1992) broke up and their dominant parties entered the next electons independently. Conversely, SLD (PL 2005) became the leading party in a new left-wing electoral alliance in 2007. Finally, SDSS involved a simple **name change** (discussed under entry).

There was a **clearer break** for some parties, such as the RP (2003; a merger) and the UD (1993), which joined with the extra-parliamentary ‘Liberal Congress’ to form the Freedom Union.

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16 Also included the smaller ‘New Union – Social Liberals’ (NS 2000).

LLS (LT 2000–2004) split following a bitter leadership contest. Overall, only few electons in Table 3 disappeared without leaving clear traces – of the parties listed, only the TKL–ZP merely dissolved itself after failing to enter parliament in 1998, winning just 1.7% of the vote.

Several electons in Table 3 fell below 2% of votes that according to PT constitutes an exit. Classifying them as exits or not has limited impact on the overall volatility given the low vote share in the second election. However, it does affect the balance between the two types of volatility distinguished by Powell & Tucker – Type A volatility caused by the exit and entry and Type B caused by vote-switching between continuing parties. In 1998, Latvian DPS won 1.6% of the vote; had it received just 0.4% more votes, Type A volatility would have lost a third of its value (from 44% to 29%). Type B volatility would have increased even more considerably from 9% to 16%. This highlights how sensitive Type A and Type B volatility are to the thresholds and classification of electons as exiting or entering (the importance of thresholds in volatility calculations has been emphasized by Bétoa, Deegan–Krause & Haughton 2017).

High levels of candidate dropout are surprisingly rare given the ubiquity of apparent exits. Out of the 296 electons in our dataset with $V \geq 5\%$, only eight recorded candidate dropout levels above 0.75 (see Table 4).18 The reasons for the high dropout rates among vary. SzDSz (HU 2006) probably anticipated electoral losses after participation in the scandal–ridden governments of Ferenc Gyurcsányi (MSzP) and both of the parties became the focus of voter dissatisfaction. The LDS (SI 2008) likewise suffered from a waning electoral appeal. Having dropped from 23% to 5% of votes between 2004 and 2008, it lost hope of entering the parliament again and was abandoned by its candidates.

| Table 4 Electons with highest candidate dropout ($V \geq 5\%$) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Vote% | Vote% (t+1) | WCD | Exit (PT) |
| Vote% | Exit (t) | WCD | Exit (PT) |
| **HU 2006-10** | 6.5 | 0.92 | **NA** | |
| **SzDSz Alliance of Free Democrats** | (10 joint candidates w MDF) | 1.5 | 0.84 | **NA** | |
| **Si 2008-11** | 5.2 | 0.79 | **NA** | |
| **LDS Liberal Democracy of Slovenia** | – | 0.79 | **NA** | |
| **CZ 2010-13** | 10.9 | 0.79 | **NA** | |
| **VV Public Affairs** | – | 0.79 | **NA** | |
| **Si 2011-14** | 8.4 | 0.79 | **NA** | |
| **LGV Gregor Virant’s Civic List** | – | 0.79 | **NA** | |
| **Si 2000-04** | 8.6 | 0.79 | **NA** | |
| **NSI New Slovenian Christian People’s Party** | – | 0.79 | **NA** | |
| **CZ 1996-98** | 6.4 | 0.76 | **+** | |
| **ODA Civic Democratic Alliance** | – | 0.76 | **+** | |
| **PL 1993-97** | 5.4 | 0.76 | **+** | |
| **BBWR Non-Party Bloc in Support of Reforms** | – | 0.76 | **+** | |
| **PL 2001-05** | 5.6 | 0.76 | **+** | |
| **AWSP Solidarity Election Action Prawicy** | – | 0.76 | **+** | |

VV (CZ 2010) and LGV (SI 2011) were ‘one–hit wonders’ whose candidates withered as quickly as they surfaced. Both had been genuinely new parties that immediately joined the government. After VV’s leading figures were accused of corruption (ironically, for an anticorruption party), the party decided not to run again. Similarly, LGV’s leader Gregor Virant was criticised for receiving unemployment payments after leaving the government that caused the party’s support to collapse immediately after its initial success. Following disastrous European elections and Virant’s resignation, many candidates who lacked political experience and incentives to stay in politics deserted. The more established Czech ODA was also weakened by scandals; it decided to skip the 1998 election and polled very poorly upon return in 2002.

The two Polish cases in Table 4 were unstable from the start. BBWR was founded to provide parliamentary support president Lech Walesa. However, Walesa fell out with the party before

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18 Table 4 also includes electons not covered in PT.
the election. His failure to return to office in 1995 deprived BBWR of its purpose and its deputies scattered into five different party groups. The AWSP succeeded the Solidarity Electoral Action (the winner of 1997 elections) but lost many prominent candidates to important new parties (PO and PiS) already in 2001.

NSi (SI 2000) is unusual, as despite its high WCD it was not weakened. NSi increased its vote share even though five of its nine MPs did not run for re-election in 2004 – one had become an MEP, while an 82-year-old probably retired. ¹⁹

The main message here is that parties do not just disappear. Even when an election becomes extinct, it usually leaves behind traces in the form of their former elites. Notably, parties not exiting account for some of the highest dropout levels – five of the electons in Table 4 did not entirely disappear. The asymmetry with candidate novelty is remarkable – there have been many genuinely new parties, but genuine disappearance is rarer, at least among parties with significant electoral support.

However, some of the largest continuing parties did lose many candidates (Table 5). Note the much higher vote shares here than in Table 3 – successful parties tend to carry on, even in the unstable electoral climate of Central and Eastern Europe. The BSP-led coalition (BG 1994) lost more than a half of their candidates in the following election ²⁰ and several others came close to 50%. However, low candidate dropout dominates, with most losing only one third of candidates, and often much less.

**Table 5 Candidate dropout among the largest continuing electons**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party (year)</th>
<th>Vote</th>
<th>WCD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BG 1994-97</td>
<td>43.5</td>
<td>0.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BG 1997-2001</td>
<td>52.2</td>
<td>0.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PL 2001-05</td>
<td>41.0</td>
<td>0.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SI 2000-2004</td>
<td>36.3</td>
<td>0.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BG 2005-09</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>0.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CZ 1996-98</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>0.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CZ 2002-06</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>0.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LT 1996-2000</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>0.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PL 1997-2001</td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td>0.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EE 1995-99</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>0.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CZ 1992-96</td>
<td>29.7</td>
<td>0.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CZ 1998-2002</td>
<td>32.3</td>
<td>0.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SK 1994-98</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LT 1992-96</td>
<td>44.0</td>
<td>0.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BG 2001-05</td>
<td>42.7</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HU 1998-2002</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HU 2002-06</td>
<td>42.1</td>
<td>0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HU 2002-06</td>
<td>41.1</td>
<td>0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HU 1994-98</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HU 1998-2002</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Candidate turnover-based electon entry and exit**

When looking at the overall distribution of candidate novelty and dropout among continuing and not continuing electons (as defined in PT, see Figure 5), we see a clear distinction in the distribution of candidate novelty but substantial overlap in terms of dropout. Even though candidate novelty is generally limited in continuing electons (WCN < 0.5 in 86% of cases), we still see a significant number of entering electons with low candidate novelty. Exiting electons do lose more candidates than continuing ones but a clear majority of their

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¹⁹ Reasons for not standing again are often very difficult to establish and are well beyond the scope of this paper.

²⁰ The party collapsed in the wake of an economic crisis and fall of BPS-led government in 1996–97.
candidates returns even when their party does not (only 28% of exiting electons have a WCD above 0.5). However, only one of the continuing electons had WCD > 0.66 – this is the zone clearly dominated by exiting electons.

Figure 5. Distribution of candidate turnover among continuing and not continuing electons

Still, the different distributions suggest that WCN and WCD can be used to classify electon entry and exit – using candidate turnover as a proxy for overall party change that in principle incorporates other aspects (leaders, programmatic profile etc). We use WCN ≥ 0.75 and WCD ≥ 0.66 as thresholds for entry and exit, respectively, based on the empirical cut-offs based on the discussion above. The overall picture that emerges (bold orange line on Figure 7) is one of stability compared to existing indices – 80 percent of the time, electons dominated by seasoned candidates won more than 80 percent of the votes. The eight elections where the new electons won more than a quarter of the vote are well known cases of genuinely new party breakthrough.21

The novelty-based entry is correlated to the other indices to a varying degree – most strongly to MT (r = 0.81) and, unsurprisingly, least strongly with the rather robotic basic approach (r = 0.53). It suggests lower levels of electon entry compared to the basic approach and PT with no clear overall direction of deviation from MT and MGE.

Entry levels in some elections saw considerable corrections. New electon entry decreased compared to all three existing indices by more than 20% in three cases – Estonia 1995, Latvia 1998 and Poland 2001. All three were marked by significant partially new electons. While the first two saw a breakthrough of a single successful genuinely new party (see Table 1), the 2001 Polish election saw no less than three – the Citizen’s Platform (PO, V = 12.7%), Law & Justice (PiS, 9.5%) and the League of Polish Families (LPR, 7.9%), all with medium WCN = 0.6.22

22 For an extensive discussion, see Sikk & Köker 2017a.
As shown above, candidates very seldom leave politics even if the parties disintegrate. Adopting a threshold of $W_D = 0.66$ for a dropout-based electon exit (see Figure 8), we again see significant deviations from the basic approach and PT. Here it is slightly more common for the dropout-based estimates to exceed PT (24% of cases). However, the most dramatic divergences are in the other direction with Lithuania 2000–2004 and Latvia 1995–1998 standing out because of two exiting electons with very low candidate dropout in each (see Table 3). The main message of Figure 8 is one of stability – a big majority of electons experience candidate dropout below the 0.66 threshold. In other words, at least three quarters (but generally much more) votes go to electons that lose less than two thirds of their candidates by the next election.
Still, a problem remains that any candidate turnover threshold for entry and exit will always be somewhat arbitrary and partially new parties can only be fully included or fully excluded. Lowering the entry threshold would include parties that are not novel enough. Yet, the precise threshold value has a significant impact on the result. Exit is arguably even more problematic as most “apparently exiting” electons leave behind many – often most – candidates while parties that continue to exist occasionally experience substantial candidate dropouts. We contend that party exit is a rather elusive phenomenon and concur with Mainwaring et al (2017) that focussing on new parties only might be more fruitful for calculating extra-system volatility.

**Discussion: Beyond dichotomy**

Continuing, new and disappearing electons all come in various forms – they can be genuine or apparent or something in between. Analysis of party system stability hinges upon telling them apart regardless whether one is looking at the success of new parties or electoral volatility. This is not always easy. For example, the coalition “Working for Lithuania” (UdL 2000) carried some novelty but certainly less so than some electons from Table 1 – and not only in terms of candidates. Powell & Tucker code it as new – alongside smaller complicated cases in that election – that results in a record electoral volatility above 85%. Others report still high but still significantly lower electoral volatility – MGE reports 59% and others below 50% (including some datasets not discussed here; see Casal Bértola et al 2017). The volatility...
indices by various authors show remarkable differences well beyond this extreme case. Casal Bérlota et al 2017 find an average correlation of 0.73 between electoral volatility indices in Central and Eastern Europe in a number of datasets – we fully concur that this is “shockingly low for results that are intended to measure the same phenomenon.” (p. 145).

What explains these discrepancies and differences between the measures of electon entry? The discussion above suggests that scholars may sometimes pay excessive attention to superficial changes and may overlook important continuities between elections.23 Many of the problematic elections are from smaller countries (Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia) on which less information is presumably available. The analysis in Appendix 3 suggests that smaller country and electon size weakens agreement between different indices of party entry. We urge considering candidate turnover (even unweighted) when making coding decisions – that information is relatively easily available for most recent elections, regardless of our levels of expertise about parties and countries.24

However, we would go further and argue that a meaningful coding of parties as continuous and non-continuous is sometimes impossible. As we have seen, many partially new electons defy a clear-cut classification. Coding them as new rather than continuing can dramatically increase volatility measures. Hence, we believe a new approach to electoral volatility is necessary that takes into account novelty/dropout of candidates as well as their movement between electons (not discussed in this chapter) and does away with a strictly dichotomous coding (outlined as “split-vote-by-congruence” in Sikk & Köker 2017a).

Like us, you might find the complexity of party novelty slightly intimidating. The notion of degrees of change are much more difficult to implement in empirical research than binary categories. However, the choice is not between simple and complex – it is between wrong and (more) right. A flat Earth is much less complex than a geoid, but simplicity does not make the idea attractive. Seemingly complex ideas – like degrees of party change – may sound alien to outside audiences (i.e. beyond party researchers and political scientists) and alienate the world outside our ivory towers. Still, black and white indicators of party system change that poorly chime with real-life experiences may have even more significant downsides.25 Many believed in flat Earth for centuries even after it had been proved otherwise, but very few do today, and very few are troubled by the relative complexity of a round world.

23 This is partly linked to the necessity in dichotomous coding schemes to decide on a single successor/predecessor in case of splits and mergers.
24 In the absence of candidate data, MP turnover can be an acceptable proxy, although it is problematic for smaller and parties moving in and out of the parliament. MP data would exclude significant parties with interrupted or no parliamentary representation (e.g. the German Free Democrats). MP turnover for smaller parties is highly sensitive to trivial changes. For example, in the 2015 UK elections, one out of three Plaid Cymru (PC) MPs changed. This smallest possible change amounted to a substantial 33% turnover. For the Conservatives, that would have required the change of more than 100 MPs. Just one more new PC MP would have increased turnover to 67% while only one fewer would have brought it down to zero.
25 Witness the recent and very public exchange between Andrew Gelman and the Electoral Integrity Project, sparked (amongst other things) by the bizarre “moderate” electoral integrity score for North Korea. See http://andrewgelman.com/2017/01/02/about-that-bogus-claim-that-north-carolina-is-no-longer-a-democracy/ (accessed 30 July 2018).
Works Cited


## Appendix 1: All high candidate novelty electons (≥ .75, V% > 5)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Party Name</th>
<th>V%</th>
<th>WCN</th>
<th>PT</th>
<th>MT</th>
<th>basic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EE</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Electoral Union 'Our Home is Estonia'</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SK</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>SOP Party of Civic Understanding</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HU</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>LMP Politics Can Be Different</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LV</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>JL New Era</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PL</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SK</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Smer Direction-Social Democracy</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EE</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>EER Estonian Greens</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LT</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>TPP National Resurrection Party</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PL</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>RP Palkot's Movement</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SK</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>SaS Freedom and Solidarity</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SK</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>O'Lano Ordinary People and Independent Personalities</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SK</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>SR</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SI</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>SMC Party of Miro Cesar</td>
<td>34.5</td>
<td>0.94</td>
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<tr>
<td>BG</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>NDSV National Movement Simeon the Second</td>
<td>42.7</td>
<td>0.93</td>
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<td>LV</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>JP New Party</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>0.93</td>
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<td>SK</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>ANO Alliance of the New Citizen</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>0.93</td>
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<tr>
<td>BG</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>GERB Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria</td>
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<td>LV</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>ZRS Zatler’s Reform Party</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>0.91</td>
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<td>PL</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>KUKIZ15</td>
<td>8.8</td>
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<td>DP Labour Party</td>
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<td>CZ</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>ANO 2011</td>
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<td>2003</td>
<td>RP Union for the Republic</td>
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<td>2012</td>
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<td>2001</td>
<td>SRP Self-Defence of the Polish Republic</td>
<td>10.2</td>
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<td>1996</td>
<td>SPR-RSC Association for the Republic - Republican Party of Czechoslovakia</td>
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<td>0.76</td>
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<td>LV</td>
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<td>NLS For Latvia from the Heart</td>
<td>6.9</td>
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<td>Desus Democratic Party of Pensioners of Slovenia</td>
<td>7.4</td>
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Appendix 2: Relationship between aggregate entry and exit

Elections characterised by higher than average entry and exit (green labels in Figure 9) all saw partially or non-genuinely new electons; vice versa, where such electons were present both of the indices were high (cf Table 1). This suggests that concurrent high entry and exit may not be a natural state of things but rather flag potential issues with the classification of electons.

Figure 9 Total electon entry and exit, by election (PT)

Source: Based on Powell & Tucker 2014 raw data.
Appendix 3: Relationship between candidate turnover and entry/exit classification

Weighted turnover and PT entry/exit

Quite a few entering electons with limited novelty (< .3) and some with very low novelty. A small handful of fairly novel continuing parties but all fairly small (v < 5%).

Many parties with low dropout classified as exits, including some large parties (v > 10%). These are mostly electoral coalitions (LB under 2% inclusion threshold in 1996). A small number (5) of small parties (v < 10%) experienced high dropout (> .65) without exiting.
Clearly increased correspondence for larger parties – probably because continuities are better known for them. At 2% almost 50:50 chance that a party with low novelty classifies as a PT entry, at $v = 50\%$, 85% chance that classified as a new entry (black, overall line). Poorer correspondence for parties in countries under 6m.

High novelty electons generally classified as entries (few “false negatives”, assuming for a moment “correctness” of novelty-based approach). Many (~35%) low novelty (< .5) electons classified as entries (“false positives”). There are more of them in small countries, where more than 1/3 of low novelty electons are classified as entries (second bar on the Figure). “False positives” are less common in larger countries.
Weighted turnover and MT entry/exit

The correspondence between MT entry and novelty-based entry is significantly better, particularly for small parties and in smaller countries:

MT & PT disagree more on smaller countries and smaller parties. Disagreement generally means (with one exception) that PT see entry where MT does not. Overall 56% of PT entries are not classified as entries by MT.
Weighted candidate novelty and entry (PT and MT)

Tavits: weighted novelty clearly connected to entry among large parties, declining relevance for smaller ones, becoming nearly arbitrary among \(v<5\).

PT: less clear relationship across the board, but still stronger among larger parties. Absent (mildly inverse!) among \(v<5\).

Tavits: High-novelty elections with considerable vote shares \((v > 3)\) classified as new. When novelty drops below \(0.5\) mostly classified as continuing, but mostly from \(v > 5\) on and higher standard error. In the “grey zone” \((0.5 < \text{novelty} < 0.75)\), mostly no entry, but wide confidence intervals.

PT: The picture is clear with high-novelty elections, but not among small parties. Awkward pattern in the “grey zone” – the higher the vote share, the more likely to be classified as an entry (makes sense, generally lower threshold for novelty in PT). For low-novelty elections, much less pronounced fall-off than in Tavits.

Overall: weighted novelty clearly linked to entry, especially in Tavits. More uncertainty among smaller parties – probably because of increased ignorance.